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The EU proposal on the quantity restraint of the emissions trading in the
Kyoto Protocol aims at reducing so called hot air that would be generated by the
purchase of emissions permits sold by a country whose actual emissions are much
lower than the assigned amount.  This proposal allows demanders to choose one out of
ten possible quantity restraints, but suppliers have no choice on the restraint.  In this
paper, we show that no quantity restraint of all demanders is not a subgame perfect
equilibrium, but quantity restraints with at least one country constitute the equilibria.












The Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Convention in December 1997 requires that
Annex B Parties under the Protocol (that is, advanced countries and countries that are
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy) do not exceed their
assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments. In order to implement this goal, it authorizes three major
mechanisms called the Kyoto mechanism. These are emissions trading, joint
implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  However, we must
design the details of these mechanisms as almost no details are given in the Protocol.
The Fourth Conference of Parties at Buenos Aires in November 1998 following the
Kyoto Conference adopted a "Plan of Action," but this plan is a timetable regarding
what should be argued when, and hence no details of the protocol are given.  Although
the Fifth Conference of Parties at Bonn in November 1999 unofficially called for the
ratification of the protocol by 2002, the details of the mechanisms will be determined at
Hague on November, 2000.
One of the central issues in the Kyoto Protocol has been supplementarity of
the Kyoto mechanism to domestic actions in reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
emissions. The European Community and several countries have been proposing
quantitative constraints on the usage of three mechanisms.  Specifically, the European
Union Council of Ministers agreed on recommendations on definitions for
supplementarity for the Kyoto Protocol on May 18, 1999, and EU proposed this new
formula during the tenth sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies held at Bonn from May 31
to June 11, 1999 (see Council Conclusions on a Community Strategy on Climate
Change (1999)): Net acquisitions by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto mechanisms2
together must not exceed the higher of the two following alternatives:
(1) 5% of : 
its base year emissions multiplied by 5 plus its assigned amount
2
; or
(2) 50% of: the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year of the period
from 1994 to 2002, multiplied by 5, and its assigned amount.
Net transfers by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto mechanisms together
must not exceed (1).
Consider an example.  Assume that a country emitted 100 units of GHGs in
1990, and assume further that the country's assigned amount is 94% per year of the
emissions in 1990.  By using formula (1), we have {( )/ } . . 100 5 94 5 2 0 05 24 25 ×+ × × = .
That is, the country can rely on the Kyoto mechanism up to 24.25 units of acquisitions
from the year of 2008 to 2012.  Next, consider annual actual emissions from 1994 to
2002.  There must be nine numbers.  Suppose that annual actual emissions in 1999 are
124 units.  Applying (2), we obtain () . 124 5 94 5 0 5 75 ×− × × = .  That is, the country can
acquire up to 75 units from 2008 to 2012.  Thus, the country can choose one number out
of ten numbers from formulas (1) and (2).  The EU proposal says that the number is the
upper limit of acquisitions of the country.  On the other hand, if the country wants to
become a supplier, then the maximum transfers must not exceed the quantity obtained
by formula (1).
The EU proposal opens up two important strategic behaviors on the quantity
restraints in Annex B countries.  First, since a country that acquires emissions permits
and credits can choose her own upper limit out of possible ten numbers, the choice
itself is a strategy.  Second, since a country can choose a number that has not yet
realized, if the country wants to extend the upper limit, she would ban on the3
production of GHGs in 2001, and then cancel it at the beginning of 2002. By this way,
the upper limit would be relaxed.  On the other hand, because a country that supplies
emissions permits and credits has just one upper limit, she cannot use the limit as a
strategic variable.
Although the EU proposal put quantitative constraints to all three
mechanisms, the applicability of supplementarity to all of them is doubtful. The Kyoto
Protocol clearly states that both joint implementation and emissions trading are
supplemental to domestic actions (Articles 6 and 17). However, there is no explicit
statement on supplementarity for CDM (Article 12). Therefore, we do not impose any
quantity restraint on the supply accruing from CDM in this paper.
Baron, Bosi, Lanza and Pershing (1999) are the initiators analyzing the
proposal assuming that each country chooses the highest number among ten
possibilities. Further, Kaino (1999) evaluates supplementarity in the Kyoto Protocol
and then proposes some numerical simulation of the proposal.  In this paper, we focus
upon the strategic nature of the proposal.  Specifically, we examine how the quantity
restraints in the EU proposal affect on the total trading quantity of emissions permits,
the price of emissions permits, and the payoffs of demanders and a supplier, by using a
simple game-theoretic model. We find that each demander has a strong incentive to
choose a quantity restraint in the following two-stage game. In the first stage, each
demander simultaneously chooses whether or not she chooses a quantity restraint. In
the second stage, the demanders that decided to choose quantity restraints
simultaneously select their levels of quantity restraints, knowing the other demanders'
quantity restraint decisions in the first stage. Then emissions trades occur: the
quantities of all countries and the price are determined so that quantity demanded is4
equal to quantity supplied in a competitive emissions trading market.
We show that no quantity restraint of all demanders is not a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the above two-stage game. Rather, at least one demander always puts a
restraint as a subgame perfect strategy. On the other hand, the quantity restraints by
demanders have a negative impact on the supplier. As the number of demanders
choosing quantity restraints increases, the profit of supplier decreases, since the total
trading quantity and the price decrease. Although achieving the goal of the EU
proposal is uncertain, it certainly benefits demanders including EU with the sacrifice of
suppliers such as countries in transition to a market economy and developing
countries.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 investigates the basic model
without CDM or supplier's quantity restraint. Section 3 introduces a more general
model with CDM and supplier's quantity restraint. For both models, we examine the
effects of quantity restraints of demanders on the total trading quantity, price, and the
payoff of a supplier as well as the payoffs of demanders. Section 4 discusses the future
agenda.5
2. The basic model without CDM or supplier’s quantity restraint.
Consider three countries, indexed by 0, 1, and 2.1 We assume that the
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve of each country is linear, as illustrated in Figure
1 in which the horizontal axis denotes the quantity of emissions and the vertical axis
represents the marginal abatement cost. The vertical dotted line indicates the goal
amount assigned to each country by the Kyoto Protocol. We assume that countries 1
and 2 have the same MAC curve and the same assigned amount.

Figure 1 is around here.

In order to analyze the emissions trading market, it is convenient to
superimpose Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the MAC curves such that the assigned amount of
every country is equal to the origin of the superimposed figure. See Figure 2.

Figure 2 is around here.

We denote the MAC curve of each country i in the superimposed figure by
MAC x a a b x ii i i ii () (/) =− , i = 012 ,,, where xi is the difference between country i’s
quantity of emissions and its assigned amount. Since countries 1 and 2 have the same
MAC curve and the same assigned amount,
(A1) aa 12 =  and bb 12 = .
We also assume that
(A2) aa 10 0 >> , b1 0 > , and b0 0 > .
                                                     
1 Throughout the paper, we focus on the case of three countries, one supplier and two demanders.
However, it is easy to show that our main results hold in a more general case in which there are n
demanders.6
 (A2) means that (i) ab ii / > 0, that is, the marginal cost to abate emissions increases as
the quantity of emissions decreases; and (ii) the MAC curve of country 0 is below that
of country 1 or 2 around xi = 0, although the MAC curve of country 0 could intersect
that of country 1 or 2, because of no assumption on the relation between their slopes,
ab 00 /  and ab 11 / .
Since the MAC curve of country 0 is below that of country 1 or 2 around
xi = 0, country 0 is a supplier (x0 0 < ), while countries 1 and 2 are demanders
(x1 0 > ,x2 0 > ) in the competitive emissions trading market, as Figure 2 shows. The
competitive equilibrium price is p() ∅  at which the total quantity demanded is equal to
the quantity supplied.2  The amount of emissions permits that each country
i ∈ {,} 12 buys from country 0 at p() ∅  is xi() ∅ .  Because countries 1 and 2 have the
same MAC curve, xx 12 () () ∅= ∅ . The total amount of emissions permits that country 0
sells to countries 1 and 2 at p() ∅  is xx 12 () () ∅+ ∅ . The marginal abatement cost of
each country is equal to the price p() ∅ .
The area of the triangle a p e 1 () ∅  represents the surplus of each demander by
emissions trading (abusing notation, we use ai, bi, and p() ∅  to represent points on the
two-dimensional space, although they themselves are real numbers.) For example,
suppose that b1  is the status quo of country i ∈ {,} 12 . Then the area of the triangle
ab 11 0  denotes the abatement cost of country i to achieve the goal (xi = 0) without
emissions trading. On the other hand, with emissions trading, the cost to buy xi() ∅  of
emissions permits from country 0 at the price p() ∅  is equal to the area of the7
rectangular p xe i () () ∅∅ 0 , and the domestic cost of country i to reduce (bx i 1 −∅ () ) of
emissions is equal to the area of the triangle ex b i() ∅ 1.  Therefore, the area of the
trapezoid pb e () ∅ 0 1  stands for the total abatement cost with emissions trading. The
difference between the abatement cost without emissions trading and that with
emissions trading is the surplus of each demander by emissions trading, which is equal
to the area of the triangle a p e 1 () ∅ .
Moreover, the area of the triangle  fa p 0 () ∅  denotes the surplus of the supplier
by emissions trading. For example, suppose that b0 is the status quo of country 0.
Then the area of the triangle ab 00 0  stands for the abatement cost of country 0 to
achieve the goal (x0 0 = ) without emissions trading. On the other hand, with emissions
trading, if country 0 reduces xx 12 () () ∅+ ∅  of emissions in addition to the assigned
amount, then she can sell xi() ∅  of emissions permits to each country i ∈ {,} 12 . In
comparison to the case in which country 0 reduces emissions to the assigned amount
without emissions trading, the additional cost is equal to the area of the trapezoid
f xx a ([ ( ) ( ) ] ) −∅ +∅ 12 0 0 .  If country 0 sells xx 12 () () ∅+ ∅  of emissions permits at the
price p() ∅ , then the surplus of country 0 by emissions trading is equal to the area of
the triangle  fa p 0 () ∅ . Notice that the surplus of each country is independent of its
status quo.
We ask whether a demander has an incentive to choose a restraint on the
trading quantity of emissions permits.  In an attempt to examine this question, we
consider the following two-stage game (see Figure 3). In the first stage, each country
                                                                                                                                                           
2 In the following, we will analyze the situation in which each demander chooses a restraint on the trading
quantity of emissions permits. The symbol ∅  represents the case in which no country selects a quantity
restraint.8
i ∈ {,} 12  simultaneously chooses whether or not she chooses a quantity restraint. In the
second stage, the countries that decided to choose quantity restraints simultaneously
select their levels of quantity restraints, knowing the other countries' quantity restraint
decisions in the first stage. Then emissions trades occur: the quantities of all countries
and the price are determined so that the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity
supplied. In other words, we assume that the emissions trading market is competitive.3

Figure 3 is around here.

We will derive the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Let
R⊆ {,} 12 be the countries that decide to choose quantity restraints in the first stage.
Also, let xR i()  be the equilibrium quantity of country i ∈ {,} 12 , p R ()  be the equilibrium
price, and π i R ()  be the equilibrium payoff (surplus) of country i ∈ {,} 12  when the
countries belonging in R choose quantity restraints.  There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: R =∅ (the case of no quantity restraint)
As we see in the above, Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium quantities and the
price for this case. We can compute them by solving the following simultaneous
equations: −=+ xxx 012  (the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied),
pa a b x =− 00 0 0 (/), pa a b x =− 11 1 1 (/), and pa a b x =− 11 1 2 (/) (the price is equal to the













                                                     
3 Our two-stage model seems to be artificial, but we can clearly compare the results for all possible cases of
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It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium values are strictly positive under
Assumption (A2).
Case 2: R = {,} 12 (the case in which both countries 1 and 2 choose quantity restraints)
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium values for Case 2. Suppose that each
country i ∈ {,} 12  sets her quantity restraint level at xi({ , }) 12 , and she buys that amount
of emissions permits from country 0.  Then at the price p({ , }) 12 , the total quantity
demanded is equal to the quantity supplied. The total amount of emissions permits
that country 0 sells at p({ , }) 12  is xx 12 12 12 ({ , }) ({ , }) + . The marginal abatement cost of
country 0 is equal to p({ , }) 12 . The area of the trapezoid a p gh 1 12 ({ , })  represents the
payoff of each country i ∈ {,} 12 , π i({ , }) 12 .
We assume that each country i ∈ {,} 12  selects its quantity restraint level in
order to maximize its own payoff, given the quantity restraint level of the other
country. We can compute the unique Nash equilibrium as follows.  The payoff of
country i ∈ {,} 12  is given by
π ii i i ap M A C xp x =− + −
1
2
1 (( ) ) ,
where p aa b x =− 00 0 0 (/) (the price is equal to the abatement cost of country 0),
−=+ xxx 012 (the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied), and
                                                                                                                                                           
model.10
MAC x a a b x ii i () (/) =− 11 1 .
By using these equations, we obtain




















()  (i j j i ,, ; =≠ 12 ).
Given xj, each country i ∈ {,} 12  chooses xi so as to maximize π i . The first order
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It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium values are strictly positive under
Assumption (A2).
Case 3: Ri = {}(the case in which only one demander i chooses a quantity restraint)
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium values for Case 3. Suppose that country i
sets her quantity restraint level at xi i({ }), and she buys that amount of emissions
permits from country 0. Then at the price p i ({ }), the total quantity demanded is equal
to the quantity supplied. The amount of emissions permits that country  j i ≠  buys from
country 0 at p i ({ }) is xi j({ }). The total amount of emissions permits that country 0 sells
at p i ({ }) is xi xi ij ({ }) ({ }) + . Both the marginal abatement cost of country 0 and that of11
country j are equal to the price p i ({ }). The area of the trapezoid a p ih 1 ({ })  represents
the payoff of country i , π i i ({ }). The area of the triangle a p im 1 ({ })  represents the
equilibrium payoff of country j, π j i ({ }).
We assume that country i  selects her quantity restraint level in order to
maximize her own payoff. We can compute the unique optimal quantity restraint level
of country i as follows. The payoff of i is given by
π ii i i ap M A C xp x =− + −
1
2
1 (( ) ) ,
where p aa b x =− 00 0 0 (/) , pa ab x j =− 11 1 (/),  ji ≠  (the price is equal to both the
abatement cost of country 0 and that of country  ji ≠ ), −=+ xxx 012 (the quantity
demanded is equal to the quantity supplied),  and MAC x a a b x ii i () (/) =− 11 1 .
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,  ji ≠ .
It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium values are strictly positive under
Assumption (A2). 4





( ) ( ( )) ( )( ( )) [ ( )( ) ] Rp R a x R p R a x R x R =− − = − +  be the
equilibrium payoff of country 0. We have the following result on the total equilibrium
trading quantity, the equilibrium price, and the equilibrium payoff of country 0.
Theorem 1. For i = 12 , , xxx i x i x x 121 2 1 2 12 12 0 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + > ,
p p i p a ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > 12 0 , and π π π 00 0 12 0 ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > i .
Proof of Theorem 1: By (1), (4), (7), and (8),
xR xR 12 () () +=
bb a a ab rab
ab ab ab rab
01 1 0 10 01




() [ ( ) ]
[] [ ( ) ]
−+ −
++ −
>  for all R⊆ {,} 12 , where rR = .  By
partially differentiating this with respect to r, we obtain
∂
∂


















[] [ ( ) ]
,
implying that xxx i x i x x 121 2 1 2 12 12 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + . It follows from this
relation that pp i p a ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > 12 0  and π π π 00 0 12 ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > i .  
                                                     
4 Note that  xi x ii ({ }) ({ , }) = 12 , that is, the quantity restraint level when only one country choose a restraint is
equal to that when two countries choose restraints in our simple linear model.13
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Theorem 1. As the number of demanders
choosing quantity restraints increases, the total trading quantity, the price, and the
profit of the supplier decrease.
Concerning the equilibrium payoffs of two demanders, we have the following
relations.
Theorem 2.  For ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ , π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >>> ∅ π π jj j ({ }) ( ).
Proof of Theorem 2: First of all, by (6) and (11), we have
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, ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ .
Second, by (10) and (11), we obtain





















, ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ .
Third, by (3) and (10), we have


















() ( ) ( )
,  j∈ {,} 12 .  
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Theorem 2.  Since α β δ +< , the area of the
trapezoid a p gh 1 12 ({ , })  is larger than the area of the triangle a p im 1 ({ }) , that is,
π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > . Also, it is clear that the area of the triangle a p im 1 ({ })  is larger than
the area of the trapezoid a p ih 1 ({ }) , that is, π π π jij ii j ({ }) ({ }) ({ }) >= . Further, since
α γ < , the area of the trapezoid a p ih 1 ({ })  is larger than the area of the triangle14
ap e 1 () ∅ , that is, π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅ , i ∈ {,} 12 .
Table 1 is the payoff matrix for the first stage decisions on quantity restraints.
For each country, deciding to choose a quantity restraint in the first stage is a dominant
strategy, since the payoff with choosing a quantity restraint is larger than that without
it, regardless of whether the other country chooses a quantity restraint.

Table 1 is around here.

To sum up, at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game,
each country decides to choose a quantity restraint at the first stage, she sets her
restraint level at that specified in (4) at the second stage, and then she buys that
amount of emissions permits from country 0.
Finally, we compare the total equilibrium surpluses.
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Proof of Theorem 3: By using (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8), and (9), we have
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It is easy to obtain from (3), (6), (10), (11), and the above equations that15
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By comparing these values, we have
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Theorem 3 says that as the number of demanders choosing quantity restraints
increases, the total surplus, defined as the sum of the payoffs of all three countries,
decreases. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome in which two countries select quantity
restraints is not efficient.
3. The model with CDM and supplier’s quantity restraint.
In this section, we introduce the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
supplier’s quantity restraint. There are three countries, indexed by 0, 1, and 2. As
before, country 0 is a supplier and countries 1 and 2 are demanders in the emissions
trading market. The MAC curves of countries 1 and 2 are the same and they are given
by MAC x a a b x ii i () ( /) =− 11 1 , i = 12 , . The MAC curve of country 0 is given by
(12) MAC x a a b x 00 0 0 00 () (/) =−  .16
We assume that country 0 puts a quantity restraint level on the emission trading,
although the restraint level is given exogenously and county 0 has no choice, as stated
in the EU proposal. Denote the quantity restraint level of country 0 by xR
0 . The MAC
curve of CDM is given by
(13) MAC x a a d x CDM
00 0 0 0 0 () (/) =−
for x0 0 ≤ . Since it is uncertain which is cheaper between the marginal abatement cost
of the cheapest CDM project and the minimum marginal abatement cost in Annex B
parties, we use the common intercept a0 in (13) and in the supplier’s MAC curve in
(12).  Figure 4 illustrates these MAC curves.

Figure 4 is around here.

We assume
(A3) aa 10 0 >> , b1 0 > , and db 00 0 >> .
(A3) means that the MAC curve of country 0 is below the MAC curves of countries 1
and 2 around xi = 0, while it is always above the MAC curve of CDM. By (12) and (13),
the constrained aggregate MAC curve of country 0 is given by
(14)  AMAC x
aab d x b d xb x
ad x d a dx x b dx b
R
RR 00
000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0
0
()
[/ ( ) ] ( ) /
() / ( / ) ( ) /
=
−+ − + ≤ ≤
−− < − +
R S |
T |
                  if 
             if  
,
provided that x0 0 ≤ .
Consider the same two-stage game on quantity restraints as that examined in
the previous section. The equilibrium quantities, price, and payoffs are given in Tables
2, 3, and 4.  See the appendix for the derivations of the equilibrium values. It is easy to
check that the equilibrium values are strictly positive under Assumption (A3).17
     
Tables 2, 3, and 4 are around here.
     
The equilibrium quantities change, depending crucially on the quantity
restraint level of country 0, xR
0 . Fix the values of the parameters aabb 01 0 1 , ,,, and d0 .
We will see that the point (, ) −− xx p 12, indicating the pair of the total equilibrium
quantity and the equilibrium price, lies on the first segment of the constrained
aggregate MAC curve for a sufficiently large value of xR
0 , while it lies on the second
segment of the curve for a sufficiently small value of xR
0 . First, for the case in which
neither country 1 nor 2 chooses a quantity restraint, the crucial value of xR
0  is  A() ∅
(see the second column in Table 2). If xR
0  is larger than  A() ∅ , then the equilibrium
quantities, x1() ∅  and x2() ∅ , are constant and the total equilibrium quantity,
xx 12 () () ∅+ ∅ , is less than () / bd xb R
00 00 +  in which the constrained aggregate MAC
curve is kinked. As Figure 5-1 illustrates, the point (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  lies on the
first segment of the curve.  Also, if xA R
0 =∅ () , then xx b d x b R
12 0 0 0 0 () ()( ) / ∅+ ∅= +
and the point (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  coincides with the kink point of the curve.
Moreover, if xA R
0 <∅ () , then x1() ∅  and x2() ∅  decrease as the value of xR
0  decreases,
and xx b d x b R
12 0 0 0 0 () ()( ) / ∅+ ∅> + .  The point (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  lies on the
second segment of the curve, as Figures 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 illustrate.
     
Figure 5-a and 5-b are around here.
     
Second, for the case in which only one country i chooses a quantity restraint,18
there are two crucial values of xR
0 ,  Ai ({ }) and Bi ({ }) (see the third and fourth columns
in Table 2). If xA i R
0 > ({ }) , then the equilibrium quantities, xi i({ }) and xi j({ }), are
constant and xi xi b dx b ij
R ({ }) ({ }) ( ) / +< + 00 00 . The point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  lies on
the first segment of the constrained aggregate MAC curve, as Figures 5-1 and 5-2
illustrate. Also, if Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 , then the equilibrium quantity of country i, xi i({ })
(country j, xi j({ })) decreases (increases) as the value of xR
0  decreases and
xi xi b dx b ij
R ({ }) ({ }) ( ) / += + 00 00 . The point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  coincides with the
kink point of the curve, as Figure 5-3 illustrates. Notice that this corner solution case
always happens for any value of xB i A i R
0 ∈ [ ({ }), ({ })]. Moreover, if Bi x R ({ })> 0 , then both
xi i({ }) and xi j({ })decrease as the value of xR
0  decreases, and
xi xi b dx b ij
R ({ }) ({ }) ( ) / +> + 00 00 . The point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  lies on the second
segment of the curve, as Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 illustrate.
Finally, for the case in which both countries 1 and 2 choose quantity restraints,
there are two crucial values of xR
0 ,  A({ , }) 12  and B({ , }) 12  (see the fifth column in Table
2). If xA R
0 12 > ({ , }), then the equilibrium quantities, x1 12 ({ , }) and x2 12 ({ , }), are
constant and () /( { , } ) ( { , } ) bd xbx x R
00 001 2 12 12 +> + . The point
( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lies on the first segment of the constrained aggregate
MAC curve, as Figures 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 illustrate. Also, if Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ ,
then x1 12 ({ , }) and x2 12 ({ , }) decrease as the value of xR
0  decreases and
xx b d x b R
12 0 0 0 0 12 12 ({ , }) ({ , }) ( ) / += + . The point ( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 1219
coincides with the kink point of the curve, as Figure 5-5 illustrates. Notice again that
this corner solution case always happens for any value of xB A R
0 12 12 ∈ [( {,} ) , ( {,} ) ] .
Moreover, if Bx R ({ , }) 12 0 > , then x1 12 ({ , }) and x2 12 ({ , }) decrease as the value of xR
0
decreases and xx b d x b R
12 0 0 0 0 12 12 ({ , }) ({ , }) ( ) / +> + . The point
( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lies on the second segment of the curve, as Figure 5-6
illustrates.
The results of Theorem 1 concerning the total equilibrium quantity, the
equilibrium price, and the profit of country 0 remain to be true, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 4. For i = 12 , , xxx i x i x x 121 2 1 2 12 12 0 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + > ,
p p i p a ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > 12 0 , and π π π 00 0 12 0 ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > i .
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in the appendix. Theorem 4 says that as the
number of demanders choosing quantity restraints increases, the total trading quantity,
the price, and the profit of the supplier decrease. Figures 5-a and 5-b illustrate the
results of Theorem 4. There are six cases to consider, depending on the quantity
restraint level of country 0, xR
0 .
Case 1: Ax R () ∅≤ 0  (see Figure 5-1).
In this case, ( ) / ( ) ( ) ( {} ) ( {} ) ( { ,} ) ( { ,} ) bd xbx x x i x i x x R
ij 00 001 2 1 2 12 12 +≥ ∅ + ∅ > + > + .  That
is, if the quantity restraint level of country 0 (the supplier) is large enough, then for
every configuration of the quantity restraint choices of two countries 1 and 2, the total20
equilibrium quantity is less than () / bd xb R
00 00 +  in which the constrained aggregate
MAC curve is kinked. Each of the three points (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12 ,
( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij , and ( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12 lies on the first segment of
the curve. The same analysis as that in the previous section applies to this case.
 Case 2: Ai x A R ({ }) ( ) << ∅ 0  (see Figure 5-2).
In this case, xx b d x b x i x i x x R
ij 12 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 12 () ()( ) / ( { } ) ( { } ) ( { , } ) ( { , } ) ∅+ ∅> + > + > + , that is,
only the total equilibrium quantity when neither country 1 nor 2 chooses a restraint is
larger than () / bd xb R
00 00 +  in which the constrained aggregate MAC curve is kinked,
while the other two total equilibrium quantities are less than it. The point
(( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  lies on the second segment of the curve, while both the point
( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  and the point ( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  remain to lie on the
first segment of the curve.
Case 3: Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 (see Figure 5-3).
In this case, xx b d x b x i x i x x R
ij 12 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 12 () ()( ) / ( { } ) ( { } ) ( { , } ) ( { , } ) ∅+ ∅> + = + > + . The
point (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  lies on the second segment of the curve, the point
( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  is equal to the kink point, and the point
( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lies on the first segment.
Case 4: Ax B i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 << (see Figure 5-4).21
In this case, xxx i x i b d x b x x ij
R
12 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 12 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ( ) / ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + > + . Both
the point  (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  and the point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij lie on the second
segment of the curve, while the point  ( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lies on the first
segment.
Case 5: Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ (see Figure 5-5).
In this case, xxx i x i b d x b x x ij
R
12 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 12 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ( ) / ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + = + . Both
the point (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12  and the point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  lie on the second
segment of the curve, while the point ( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12 is equal to the kink
point of the curve.
Case 6: xB R
0 12 < ({ , })(see Figure 5-6).
In this case, xxx i x i x x b d x b ij
R
12 1 2 0 0 0 0 12 12 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ( ) / ∅+ ∅> + > + > + . In
other word, if xR
0  is small enough, all three points (( ) ( ) , ( ) ) −∅ − ∅ ∅ xx p 12 ,
( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij , and ( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lie on the second segment of
the curve.
Next we compare the equilibrium payoffs.
Theorem 5.
a)  Case 1: Ai x R ({ })< 0 . In this case, π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ .22
Case 2: Bx A i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 ≤≤ . In this case, ππ jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >=< , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ , if and only if




−⋅ − 12 12 12 12 2.
Case 3: xB R
0 12 < ({ , }). In this case, π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ .
b) In all cases, π π π jjj ij ({ }) ({ }) ( ) >> ∅ , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ .
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in the appendix.
Remark: Condition (15) for Case 2 in Theorem 5 can be rewritten in terms of the
parameters aabbd 01010 ,,,, and xR
0 as follows:
       Case 2-(i): Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 . In this case, ππ jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >=< , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ , if and
only if ab b d a b d ab a b d ab b ax a a R
10
2








++ − − .
       Case 2-(ii): Ax B i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 << . In this case, ππ jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >=< , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ ,
 if and only if




10 0 0 1 32 ++ + + +




++ + + − aa d a b ab d a b d a x a a R
11 0 0 1
2




23 () [ ( ) ]/ ( ) .
        Case 2-(iii): Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ . In this case, ππ jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >=< , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ ,
 if and only if
 () ( ) ( ) () [ () ] b d ad ab ad ab x bb a a x a b d ab RR




00 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 34 4 ++ + − −+ + {}23
                                              
>






01 0 0 0
2 abb ad ab d a a ax R () [ ( ) ] .
According to Theorem 5, π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >  and π π jj j ({ }) ( ) >∅ , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 ,
ij ≠  if either Ai x R ({ })< 0  or xB R
0 12 < ({ , }). In other words, deciding to choose a quantity
restraint in the first stage is a dominant strategy for each country if the point
( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  and the point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xi xip i ij  lie on the same
segment of the constrained MAC curve of country 0 (see Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-6).
Figure 4 illustrates this result when Ai x A R ({ }) ( ) << ∅ 0 . Since α β δ +< , the area of the
trapezoid a p gh 1 12 ({ , })  is larger than the area of the triangle a p im 1 ({ }) , that is,
π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > . Moreover, since α γ < , the area of the trapezoid a p ih 1 ({ })  is larger
than the area of the triangle a p ie 1 ({ }) , that is, π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅ .
However, π j({ , }) 12  could be smaller than π j i ({ }) if Bx A i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 ≤≤ .
Figure 6 illustrates why this could happen, where i = 2  and  j = 1. Let us consider two
different values a1 and a1 with a1 > a1. Since the equilibrium quantities, prices, and
payoffs, x1 12 ({ , }), p({ , }) 12 , π 1 12 ({ , }), x1 2 ({ }), p({ }) 2 , and π 1 2 ({ }), change depending
on a1, we denote x1 12 ({ , }) when aa 1 1 =  by x1 12 ({ , }), x1 12 ({ , }) when aa 11 =  by
x1 12 ({ , }), and so on. In Figure 6, we assume that in both the case of aa 1 1 =  and the
case of aa 11 = , the inequalities Bx A R ({ }) ({ }) 22 0 ≤≤  hold, that is, the point
( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lies on the first segment of the constrained aggregate
MAC curve of country 0, whereas the point ( ( {} ) ( {} ) ,( {} ) ) −− xx p 12 22 2  is equal to the
kink point of the curve. In particular, notice that p p ({ }) ({ }) 22 = . Namely, even when24
the value of a1 rises from a1 to a1, the equilibrium price in which only country 2
chooses a quantity restraint does not change, since the total equilibrium quantity
remains to be equal to () / bd xb R
00 00 +  at which the constrained aggregate MAC curve
of country 0 is kinked.5
Figure 6 shows that as the value of a1 increases, π 1 2 ({ }) becomes larger than
π 1 12 ({ , }) when the equilibrium price p({ }) 2  is constant. When aa 1 1 = , the area of the
trapezoid a p gh 1 12 ({ , })  is larger than the area of the triangle a p m 1 2 ({ })  since
δ θ α β +>+ , that is, π π 11 12 2 ({ , }) ({ }) >  since the left-hand side of Inequality (15) in
Theorem 5,   pp x ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) 21 2 1 2 1 −⋅ , is larger than the right-hand side of (15),
MAC x p x x 1 11 1 12 2 2 12 2 ( ( {,} ) ) ( {} ) ( {} ) ( {,} )/ −⋅ − . On the other hand, when aa 11 = , the
area of the trapezoid ap g h 1 12 ({ , })  is smaller than the area of the triangle a p m 1 2 ({ })
since δ λ α γ +<+ , that is, π π 11 12 2 ({ , }) ({ }) <  since the left-hand side of (15) in Theorem
5,  pp x ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) 21 2 1 2 1 −⋅ , is smaller than the right-hand side of (15),
MAC x p x x 11 1 1 12 2 2 12 2 ( ( {,} ) ) ( {} ) ( {} ) ( {,} )/ −⋅ − . When the value of a1 rises from a1
to a1, the difference  pp ({ }) ({ , }) 21 2 −  decreases, whereas the difference
MAC x p 11 12 2 (( { , } ) ) ( { } ) −  increases. Moreover, the increase in x1 12 ({ , }) is smaller than
that in  xx 11 21 2 ({ }) ({ , }) − . Accordingly, the relation between the right-hand side and
the left-hand side of (15) becomes reversed, and so does the relation between π 1 12 ({ , })
and π 1 2 ({ }) when the value of a1 changes from a1 to a1.
                                                     
5 Also, note that  xx 21 21 2 ({ }) ({ , }) ≠ , that is, the quantity restraint level when only one country choose a
restraint is different from that when two countries choose restraints, in contrast to the case without CDM
or supplier’s quantity restraint. This is because the point ( ({ }) ({ }), ({ })) −− xx p 12 22 2  is equal to the kink25

Figure 6 is around here.

Next we give numerical examples to show that in the case of
Bx A i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 ≤≤ , π j({ , }) 12  may or may not be larger than π j i ({ }), depending on
the values of aabb 0101 ,,,,d0 , and xR
0 .
Example 1: Let a0 40 = , a1 100 = , b0 40 = , b1 60 = , and d0 50 = . In this case, for all
xR
0 0 ≥ , π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > . Figure 7 illustrates this fact, where i = 2, j = 1,  A() . ∅≈ 20 87 ,
A({ }) . 11 9 6 5 ≈ , B({ }) . 21 9 1 3 ≈ ,  A({ , }) . 1 2 17 78 ≈ , and B({ , }) . 1 2 15 89 ≈ . Again, for each
country, deciding to choose a quantity restraint in the first stage is a dominant strategy,
since π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 >  and π π jj j ({ }) ( ) >∅ , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ .

Figure 7 is around here.

Example 2: Let a1 10000 = and the values of the other parameters be the same as those in
Example 1, i.e., a0 40 = , b0 40 = , b1 60 = , and d0 50 = . Then π j({ , }) 12  is smaller than
π j i ({ }) for some values of xR
0 , although π j({ , }) 12  is larger than π j i ({ }) for most values
of xR
0 . Figure 8 illustrates this fact, where i = 2, j = 1,  A() . ∅≈ 52 838,  A({ }) . 1 52 768 ≈ ,
B({ }) . 25 2 7 1 3 ≈ ,  A({ , }) . 1 2 52 698 ≈ , and B({ , }) . 1 2 52 587 ≈ . If52.692 52.733 << xR
0 , then
π π 11 12 2 ({ , }) ({ }) < ; otherwise π π 11 12 2 ({ , }) ({ }) ≥ . Table 5 is the payoff matrix for the
first stage decisions on quantity restraints in the former case.  There are two Nash
                                                                                                                                                           
point of the constrained aggregate MAC curve of country 0, whereas the point26
equilibria of this game: one country chooses a quantity restraint, while the other does
not, since π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 <  and π π jj j ({ }) ( ) >∅ , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ . In any case, at least
one country chooses a quantity restraint at equilibrium, since π j j ({ }) is always larger
than π j() ∅ ,  j∈ {,} 12 .
      
Figure 8 and Table 5 are around here.
      
4. Concluding Remarks
It is obvious that the real aims of the EU proposal are to promote domestic
reductions of GHG emissions, to stimulate technological investments, to control hot air
and to commit ambitious goals in the following commitment periods. Nevertheless, the
EU proposal has strategic economic consequences such that demanders gain and
suppliers lose whether EU's policy makers intend them or not.
In the sulfur allowance program conducted by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in the US, the permits have been traded by over the counter as well as in
an auction market. Cason and Plott (1996) pointed out that the trading rule of the
auction designed by EPA has serious flaws by an experimental method. We are sure
that the designers of the auction did not have ill will. However, researchers and policy
makers must bear in mind that a mistake without malice is really a mistake.
There have been various proposals on the design of institutions at the
Conferences of Parties to the Climate Convention. We now know that only common
sense and experience are not enough to design new institutions. Various approaches
such as theory and experiment in economics would be of importance.
                                                                                                                                                           
( ({ , }) ({ , }), ({ , })) −− xx p 12 12 12 12  lies on the first segment of the curve.27
Appendix
1. The derivations of equilibrium values with CDM and supplier’s quantity
restraint.
There are eight cases to consider.
Case 1: R =∅ (the case in which neither country 1 nor 2 chooses a quantity restraint)
Case 1-1: −+ ≤ () / bd xbx R
00 000  or xA R
0 ≥∅ () .
Suppose that −+ ≤ () / bd xbx R
00 000 .  Then pa a b dx =− + 000 0 0 [/ ( ) ], p aa b x i =− 11 1 (/),
i ∈ {,} 12 , and −=+ xxx 012 . By solving these equations, or simply by replacing b0  with
bd 00 +  in (1)-(3), we obtain the equilibrium values when xA R
0 ≥∅ ()  in Tables 2-4. Note
that
x b dx b x x b dx b RR
00 0 0 0 1 20 0 0 0 ()( ) / () ()( ) / ∅+ + = − ∅− ∅+ +
                                         =
++ + − −
++
() [ () ] () ]
[( ) ]
bda bd a b x b b aa
bab d a b
R
001 00 0 1 0 0 1 10





which is non-negative if and only if xA R
0 ≥∅ () .
Case 1-2: −+ > () / bd xbx R
00 000  or xA R
0 <∅ () .
Suppose that −+ > () / bd xbx R















, p aa b x i =− 11 1 (/),












 in (1)-(3), we obtain the equilibrium values when
xA R
0 <∅ ()  in Tables 2-4. Notice that28
x b dx b x x b dx b RR
00 0 0 0 1 20 0 0 0 ()( ) / () ()( ) / ∅+ + = − ∅− ∅+ +
                                         =
++ − −
+
da b d a b x b b a a
ba d a b
R
01 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
01 0 0 1
22
2
{[ ( ) ] ( )}
[]
,
which is negative if and only if xA R
0 <∅ () .
Case 2: R = {,} 12 (the case in which every demander chooses a quantity restraint)
Case 2-1: −+ < () /( { , } ) bd xbx R
00 000 12  or xA R
0 12 > ({ , }).
Suppose that −+ < () / bd xbx R
00 000 .  Then
π ii i i ap M A C xp x =− + −
1
2
1 (( ) ) , i ∈ {,} 12 ,
where p aab d x =− + 000 0 0 [/ ( ) ], −=+ xxx 012 , and MAC x a a b x ii i () (/) =− 11 1 .
That is,
π ii j i aa

























,  j i ≠ .
Given xj, each country i  is assumed to choose xi so as to maximize its own payoff.


























0, i j i j ,{ , } , ∈≠ 12 .
From these equations, or simply by replacing b0  with bd 00 +  in (4)-(6), we obtain the
equilibrium values when xA R
0 12 > ({ , }) in Tables 2-4. Notice that
xb d x b x x b d x b RR
0 0 00 0 1 2 0 00 0 12 12 12 ({ , }) ( ) / [ ({ , }) ({ , })] ( ) / ++ = − + ++
                                             =
++ + − −
++
( ){[ ( ) ] ( )}
[( ) ]
bda bd a b x b b aa
bab d a b
R
001 00 0 1 0 0 1 10




which is positive if and only if xA R
0 12 > ({ , }).29
Case 2-2: −+ = () /( { , } ) bd xbx R
00 000 12  or Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ .
Suppose that −+ = () / bd xbx R
00 000 .  We show that if Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ , then the















, i ∈ {,} 12 .
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i     if xx ii
B > ({ , }) 12
First of all, we prove that for any xi such that 01 2 ≤< xx ii






> 0 , implying
that ππ ii
B
ii xx (( { , } ) ) ( ) 12 > . If 01 2 ≤≤ xx ii
B({ , }), then
dx
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01 1 0 0 1 0 0 01
01
bb a a x a b d ab
bb
R () [ () ] −− ++
,
which is non-negative since xA R
0 12 ≤ ({ , }).
Next we prove that for any xi such that xx ii






< 0 , implying
that ππ ii
B
ii xx (( { , } ) ) ( ) 12 > . If xx ii
B ≥ ({ , }) 12 , then30
dx
dx
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010 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 01 001
010
bbd a a x d a b d ab abb
bbd
R () { [ () ] } −− ++ +
,
which is non-positive since xB R
0 12 ≥ ({ , }).
Therefore, we conclude that ππ ii
B
ii xx (( { , } ) ) ( ) 12 >  for any xx ii
B ≠ ({ , }) 12 , and
the strategy profile ( ({ , }), ({ , })) xx BB
12 12 12  is a Nash equilibrium. By using this
equilibrium quantities, it is easy to get the equilibrium price and payoffs when
Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤  in Tables 3 and 4.
Case 2-3: −+ > () / bd xbx R
00 000  or xB R
0 12 < ({ , }).
Suppose that −+ > () / bd xbx R
00 000 . Then
π ii i i ap M A C xp x =− + −
1
2
1 (( ) ) , i ∈ {,} 12 ,
where pad x d a dx R =− − 00 0 0 0 00 () / ( / ) , −=+ xxx 012 , and MAC x a a b x ii i () (/) =− 11 1 .
By simply replacing a0 with ad x d R
00 0 0 () / −  and ab 00 /  with ad 00 /  in (4)-(6), we
obtain the equilibrium values xB R
0 12 < ({ , }) in Tables 2-4. Notice that
x b dx b x x b dx b RR
00 0 0 0 1 20 0 0 0 12 12 12 ({ , }) ( ) / ({ , }) ({ , }) ( ) / ++ = − − ++
                                             =




010 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 01 001
01 0 0 1
bbd a a x d a b d ab abb
ba d a b
R () { [ () ] }
[]
,
which is negative if and only if xB R
0 12 < ({ , }).31
Case 3: Ri = {}(the case in which only one demander i chooses a quantity restraint)
Case 3-1: −+ < () / bd xbx R
00 000  or xA i R
0 > ({ }).
Suppose that −+ < () / bd xbx R
00 000 . Then
π ii i i ap M A C xp x =− + −
1
2
1 (( ) ) ,
where pa ab x j =− 11 1 (/),  ji ≠ , p aab d x =− + 000 0 0 [/ ( ) ], −=+ xxx 012 , and
MAC x a a b x ii i () (/) =− 11 1 . By replacing b0  with bd 00 +  in (7)-(11), we obtain the
equilibrium values when xA i R
0 > ({ }) in Tables 2-4. Notice that
xi bd x b xi xi bd x b R
ij
R
0 0 00 0 0 00 0 ({ }) ( ) / [ ({ }) ({ })] ( ) / ++ = − + ++
                                         =
++ + + +−
++ ++
( ) [( ) ] [( ) ] [ ( { } ) ]
[( ) ] [( ) ]
,
bda bd a b a bd a bx A i
bab d a b ab d a b
R
00 1 00 0 1 1 00 0 1 0
010 0 0 1 10 0 0 1
3
3
which is positive if and only if xA i R
0 > ({ }).
Case 3-2: −+ = () / bd xbx R
00 000  or Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 .
Suppose that −+ = () / bd xbx R
00 000 . We show that if Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 , then the
following strategy is the best choice for i:
xi






[( ) ] ( )
≡
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10
.
The payoff of i is provided by
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[( ) ]                   if xxi ii
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> 0 , implying
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 ≥ 0. In fact,
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++
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01 1 0 0 01
23 3
which is non-negative since xA i R
0 ≤ ({ }).
Next we prove that for any xi such that xxi ii
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R π ( ({ })) ( )[ ] {[ ( ) ]( ) }
()
, =
−+ − + + + +
+
01 1 0 10 01 1 0 0 01 10 01 0101 0
01 10 01
23 3
which is non-positive since xB i R
0 ≥ ({ }).
Therefore, we conclude that ππ ii
B
ii xi x (( { } ) ) ( ) >  for any xxi ii
B ≠ ({ }), and
xi i
B({ }) is the best choice for i. By using this equilibrium quantity, it is easy to obtain the
equilibrium quantity of  ji ≠ , price, and payoffs when Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0  in Tables 2-4.
Case 3-3: −+ > () / bd xbx R
00 000  or xB i R
0 < ({ }).33
Suppose that −+ > () / bd xbx R
00 000 . Then
π ii i i ap M A C xp x =− + −
1
2
1 (( ) ) ,
where pa ab x j =− 11 1 (/),  ji ≠ , pad x d a dx R =− − 00 0 0 0 00 () / ( / ) , −=+ xxx 012 , and
MAC x a a b x ii i () (/) =− 11 1 . By simply replacing a0 with ad x d R
00 0 0 () / −  and ab 00 /
with ad 00 /  in (7)-(11), we obtain the equilibrium values when xB i R
0 < ({ }) in Tables 2-
4. Note that
xi bd x b xi xi bd x b R
ij
R
0 0 00 0 0 00 0 ({ }) ( ) / [ ({ }) ({ })] ( ) / ++ = − + ++
                                          =
++ + + −
++
d a b d ab ad ab aabb x B i
ba d a b a d a b
R
0 1 0 0 01 10 01 0101 0
01 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
3
3
{[ ( ) ]( ) }[ ({ })]
() ( )
,
which is negative if and only if xB i R
0 < ({ }).
2. Proof of Theorem 4.
We will show that xxx i x i x x 121 2 1 2 12 12 0 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + > .  It
follows from this relation that p p i p a ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > 12 0 , and
π π π 00 0 12 0 ( ) ({ }) ({ , }) ∅> > > i . There are six cases to consider.
Case 1: Ax R () ∅≤ 0 . By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 1, it is easy
to prove that () / bd xb R
00 00 +≥  xxx i x i x x ij 12 1 2 12 12 0 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > + > .
Case 2: Ai x A R ({ }) ( ) << ∅ 0 . By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 1, it
is easy to check that () / bd xb R
00 00 +> xi xi ij ({ }) ({ }) +> xx 12 12 12 0 ({ , }) ({ , }) +> .34
Moreover, xx b d x b R
12 0 0 0 0 () ()( ) / ∅+ ∅> + . Therefore, we have the desired result.
Case 3: Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 .  In this case, xx b d x b R
12 0 0 0 0 () ()( ) / ∅+ ∅> + ,
( ) / ( {} ) ( {} ) bd xbx ix i R
ij 00 00 += +, and ( ) / ({ , }) ({ , }) bd xbx x R
00 001 2 12 12 0 +> + > . From
these inequalities, we have the desired result.
Case 4: Ax B i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 << . By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 1,
it is easy to check that xx 12 () () ∅+ ∅> xi xi ij ({ }) ({ }) +> () / bd xb R
00 00 + . Moreover,
() /( { , } ) ( { , } ) bd xbx x R
00 001 2 12 12 0 +> + > . Therefore, we have the desired result.
Case 5: Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ . By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem
1, it is easy to check that xx 12 () () ∅+ ∅> xi xi ij ({ }) ({ }) +> () / bd xb R
00 00 + . Moreover,
( ) / ({ , }) ({ , }) bd xbx x R
00 001 2 12 12 0 += + > . Therefore, we have the desired result.
Case 6: xB R
0 12 < ({ , }). By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 1, it is
easy to prove that xxx i x i x x ij 12 1 2 12 12 ( ) ( ) ({ }) ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ∅+ ∅> + > +  >+ () / bd xb R
00 00 .  

3. Proof of Theorem 5.
First of all, we will prove the result for the relation between π j({ , }) 12  and π j i ({ }),
ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ . There are four cases to consider.35
Case 1:Ai x R ({ })< 0 . By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy
to prove that π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > .
Case 2:Bx A i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 ≤≤ . By using the relation that
M A Cx pi x a M A Cx x i x jj j jj j j ( ({ , })) ({ }) ({ , }) ( ({ , })) ({ })) ({ , })) 12 12 12 12 1 −⋅ = − ⋅ − ,
it is easy to obtain that
π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 −
            =− ⋅ − −⋅ − pi p x M A Cx pi x i x jj j j j ({ }) ({ , }) ({ , }) ( ({ , })) ({ }) ({ })) ({ , })) / 12 12 12 12 2.
The desired result immediately follows from the above equation.
Case 3: xB R
0 12 < ({ , }). By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is
easy to prove that π π jj i ({ , }) ({ }) 12 > .
Next we will prove that π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅ , i ∈ {,} 12 . For the case in which neither
1 nor 2 chooses a quantity restraint, we denote the equilibrium payoff of i when
xA R
0 ≥∅ ()  by π i() ∅  and that when xA R
0 <∅ ()  by π i() ∅ . That is,
π i
ab b d a a



























 (see Table 4).
Moreover, for the case in which only i chooses a quantity restraint, we denote the36
equilibrium payoff of i whenxA i R
0 > ({ })  by π i i ({ }), that when Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0  by
π i
B i ({ }) , and that when xB i R
0 < ({ })  by π i i ({ }). That is,
π i i
ab b d a a
ab d a b ab d a b
({ })
() ()








10 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 23
,
π i
B i ({ }) ≡  
{ [ ()] () } { () [ () ] } x a b d ab bb a a bb a a x a b d ab
abb
RR






++ − − −− ++
,
π i i ({ }) ≡
ab ad ab d a a ax
ad ab ad ab
R
11 10 01 0 1 0 00
2









There are four cases to consider.
Case 1:Ax R () ∅≤ 0 . In this case, π π ii () () ∅= ∅  and π π ii ii ({ }) ({ }) = . By using the same
idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to prove that π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅ .

















0 = . Therefore, it is sufficient to show that π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅  if
xA R
0 =∅ () . Let xA R
0 =∅ () . Then π π ii () () ∅= ∅ .  Moreover, by the above result for the
Case 1, π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅ . Thus we have the desired result.
Case 3:xB i R
0 < ({ }). In this case, π π ii () () ∅= ∅ and π π ii ii ({ }) ({ }) = . By using the same
idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to prove that π π ii i ({ }) ( ) >∅ .
Case 4: Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 . In this case, π π ii () () ∅= ∅  and ππ ii


















0 ≥  if xA R
0 ≤∅ () . Moreover, ππ π i
B
i i ii ({ }) ({ }) ( ) => ∅  if
xA i R
0 = ({ }) and ππ π i
B
ii ii ({ }) ({ }) ( ) => ∅  if xB i R
0 = ({ }). These imply that ππ i
B
i i ({ }) ( ) >∅
if Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 .
Finally, we will prove that π π jj ij ({ }) ({ }) > , ij ,{ , } ∈ 12 , ij ≠ . Without loss of
generality, let i = 2 and j = 1. For the case in which only 2 chooses a quantity restraint,
but 1 not, we denote the equilibrium payoff of 1 whenxA R
0 2 > ({ }) by π 1 2 ({ }), that
when Bx A R ({ }) ({ }) 22 0 ≤≤  by π 1 2 B({ }), and that when xB R
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2
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2
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ab b d a a a b d ab
ab d a b ab d a b
,
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π 1 2 ({ }) ≡
ab ad ab d a a ax
















 (see Table 4).
There are three cases to consider.
Case 1:Ax R ({ }) 2 0 < . In this case, π π 11 22 ({ }) ({ }) =  and π π 11 11 ({ }) ({ }) = . By using the
same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to prove that π π 11 21 ({ }) ({ }) > .





















> . Therefore, it is sufficient to show that38
ππ 11 21 BB ({ }) ({ }) >  if xA R
0 1 = ({ }). Let xA R
0 1 = ({ }). Then ππ 11 22 B({ }) ({ }) =  and
ππ 11 11 B({ }) ({ }) = . By using the same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to
prove that π π 11 21 ({ }) ({ }) > .
Case 3:xB R
0 2 < ({ }). In this case, π π 11 22 ({ }) ({ }) =  and π π 11 21 ({ }) ({ }) = . By using the
same idea as that of the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to prove that π π 11 21 ({ }) ({ }) > .39
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Table 1. The Payoff Matrix for the First Stage Decisions 




π 1 12 ({ , })
π 2 12 ({ , })
π 1 2 ({ })
π 2 2 ({ })
π 1({ }) ∅
π 2({ }) ∅
π 1 1 ({ })
π 2 1 ({ })Neither country 1 nor
2 chooses a quantity
restraint.
Only one country i chooses a quantity restraint. Both countries 1 and
2 choose quantity
restraints.
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Table 2. The Equilibrium Quantities with CDM and Supplier’s Quantity Restraint.Neither country 1
nor 2 chooses a
quantity restraint.
Only one country i chooses a quantity restraint. Both countries 1 and 2 choose quantity
restraints.
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Table 3. The Equilibrium Prices with CDM and Supplier’s Quantity Restraint.Neither country 1 nor
2 chooses a quantity
restraint.
Only one country i chooses a quantity restraint. Both countries 1 and 2 choose
quantity restraints.
π i() ∅ , i = 12 , π i i ({ }) π j i ({ }),  ji ≠ π i({ , }) 12 , i = 12 ,
Ax R () ∅≤ 0 ab b d a a











ab b d a a





10 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 23
() ()
[( ) ] [( ) ]
+−
++ ++
ab b d a a a b d ab





10 0 0 1
2
10 0 0 1
2




() () [ () ]
[( ) ] [( ) ]
+− + +
++ ++
bb d ab d a b a a
ab d a b
10 0 10 0 0 1 1 0
2








Ai x A R ({ }) ( ) << ∅ 0 ab d a a ax
ad ab
R








ab b d a a





10 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 23
() ()
[( ) ] [( ) ]
+−
++ ++
ab b d a a a b d ab





10 0 0 1
2
10 0 0 1
2




() () [ () ]
[( ) ] [( ) ]
+− + +
++ ++
bb d ab d a b a a
ab d a b
10 0 10 0 0 1 1 0
2








Bi x Ai R ({ }) ({ }) ≤≤ 0 ab d a a ax
ad ab
R













Cxa b d a b b b a a R ≡+ + − − 0 1 0 0 01 01 1 0 [( ) ] ( )
Db b aa x a bd a b R ≡− −+ + 33 01 1 0 0 1 0 0 01 () [ () ]
bba a a x
ab
R




[( ) ] −− bb d ab d a b a a
ab d a b
10 0 10 0 0 1 1 0
2








Ax B i R ({ , }) ({ }) 12 0 << ab d a a ax
ad ab
R








ab ad ab d a a ax
ad ab ad ab
R
11 10 01 0 1 0 00
2








ab ad ab d a a ax
















bb d ab d a b a a
ab d a b
10 0 10 0 0 1 1 0
2








Bx A R ({ , }) ({ , }) 12 12 0 ≤≤ ab d a a ax
ad ab
R








ab ad ab d a a ax
ad ab ad ab
R
11 10 01 0 1 0 00
2








ab ad ab d a a ax
























Eb b aa x a bd a b R ≡− −+ + 44 01 1 0 0 1 0 0 01 () [ () ]
xB R
0 12 < ({ , }) ab d a a ax
ad ab
R








ab ad ab d a a ax
ad ab ad ab
R
11 10 01 0 1 0 00
2








ab ad ab d a a ax
















ba d a b da a a x
da d a b
R
11 0 0 1 01 0 0 0
2




















10 0 0 1
,  Ai
bb a a a b d ab
ab d a b ab d a b
({ })
() [ () ]




01 1 0 1 0 0 01




bb a a ad ab
ab d a b a d a b a a b b
({ })
() [ ]




01 1 0 10 01










































π 1 12 ({ , })
π 2 12 ({ , })
π 1 2 ({ })
π 2 2 ({ })
π 1({ }) ∅
π 2({ }) ∅
π 1 1 ({ })
π 2 1 ({ })